The Sorsogon Experience
THE SORSOGON EXPERIENCE
On 14 April 2014, the first Scout Ranger Regiment was tasked to deploy a company of Scout Ranger students and one regular Scout Ranger company, to assist the 93rd Infantry Brigade in its Internal Security Operations effort. In response, the FSRR tasked the Scout Ranger Course Class 188, under CAPTAIN DON ADRIAN CABOTAJE and the 5th Scout Ranger Company under CAPTAIN ROMEO FERDINAND N BAUTISTA VII PA to proceed to Sorsogon province. The two units were placed under the operational control of the Tasked Group Panther Bravo that orchestrated the conduct of tactical operations, in coordination with the 903rd Infantry Brigade, under BGEN JOSELITO E KAKILALA AFP.
OBSERVATIONS
A. Training-Reality Disconnect – During the conduct of training, specifically on the Heliborne Operations, helicopters were capable of transporting effortlessly, eight (8) students with full combat load; however, in the actual operations in Sorsogon, it was experienced that pilots allowed only a maximum of five (5) personnel without ration, in one loading. In the Scout Ranger operations, this is not feasible; because, separating the two (2) personnel from the rest of the team, would compromise team integrity, not to mention the unacceptable security risk it brought about. This was one of the reasons, why students opted to walk the considerable distance as a team; rather than being ferried by the UH-1H helicopter in two loading.
B. Joint Operations Concerns – The students were able to experience joint operations with both the Philippine Navy and Philippine Air Force. When the students conducted a strike operation in Ticao Island, the Philippine Navy assisted the students in Ship-to-Shore operations, as the Philippine Navy provided rubber boats and beach security. Meanwhile, the Philippine Air Force also provided aircrafts for reconnaissance; however, there was a problem in the appreciation of the mission, as the Scout Rangers cannot really investigate the reconnoited areas, because, the aircraft flew too high and the pilots would not fly any lower. The aerial reconnaissance operations, practically accomplished nothing.
C. Vulnerability of Soft Targets – In the Area of Operations, the enemy usually project themselves as a relevant and potent force by hitting soft targets, such as military personnel on R&R, isolated detachments or personnel on marketing. They would even liquidate unarmed retired military personnel, just to make a point that they mean business. However, they won’t sustain frontal engagement with the troops. Usually, upon the first burst of fire, their tendency was to scamper towards different direction and regroup at their pre-designated rally point or what they termed as “consol area” (Consolidating area).
D. Traditional Enemy Lair – It was observed that the rebels seem to be coming back at the same places, even if they suffered debacles in that area in the past. Perhaps, the concept of the traditional lair, always apply, where they are comfortable with their supporters, at the same time, they mastered the terrain including safe exits and entries.
E. Counter-Tracking Techniques – The enemies in the area were observed to use the following techniques to counter the tracking efforts of the troops: Making a U-turn and using vehicles. In making a U-turn, the enemies would pretend going towards certain direction, then allowing only two or three to proceeded, and the rest will go back at the vicinity of the encounter site and hide at the houses or prepared structures of their sympathizers. Meanwhile, the tracking dogs would continue to track the two or three enemies, who would eventually hit a road, where the prepositioned motorcycles or four wheeled vehicles were located. When the tracked persons ride the vehicles, the dogs would stop tracking.
F. AsPin Capability – While the K9dogs were very useful during the Test Mission, it was observed that foreign breed dogs had very limited tracking capability in a tropical environment. After conducting tracking for more or less 400 to 500m, foreign breed dogs would tend to stop and would need to be bathed before proceeding. The remedy for this is the use of the Asong Pinoy or commonly called AsPin. While the AsPins have limited olfactory cells for tracking compared with their foreign counterpart, they were observed to have more physical stamina to do tracking several times farther than the foreign breed dogs can.
BEST PRACTICES – After two months of continuous combat operations, the TGP-Bravo identified some of the best practices in the area of Sorsogon. Although some are considered common sense, they are worth mentioning here, as a sort of reminder that these things can be done.
A. Establishing Constriction Areas (CA) – In the conduct of initial IPB, a constriction area should initially be established. This constriction area should be shaped in a manner that the enemies will have no choice but to be canalized there at. When the area is well shaped, the troops will have all the opportunity, information and initiative to hit the enemy hard. In selecting the CA, the following are the prerequisites:
Embedded informants or action agents. At least three informants must be inside the CA, so that the TGP can countercheck or validate the information from any of them. Moreover, this will provide redundancy when one or two agents are compromised.
The area is a traditional enemy lair – This is the most probable place where the TDs would go when the area will be saturated with military operations.
The area has enough support system – This place can provide food, shelter and security. The people are generally sympathetic to them and can provide early warning during government forces’ approach.
B. Legal Procedures – The 903rd infantry Brigade had established an SOP that catered to the legal requirements of the troops. These SOPs were very practical and required stakeholders’ engagement, which includes the following:
1. SOCO personnel services – In every combat engagement, the SOCO were always available to inspect the encounter site and to establish whether the encounter was legitimate or not.
2. The filing of criminal charges to enemy personalities – All captured or involved DTs were always charged with the appropriate cases, such as illegal possession of firearms, recruiting child warriors, assaulting government authorities and the like.
3. Technical exploitation of the gadgets captured – The 9ID and the 903rd Brigade have readily available personnel, who were competent to conduct technical exploitation of IT and electronic gadgets. Products of these exploitations were used as evidences in filing charges against the armed terrorists.
4. Documentary exploitation of the documents captured – Likewise, intelligence units in the area were proficient and efficient in exploiting all the documents captured during the encounters and operations. Results of the exploitation were also used in filing charges against the armed terrorists.
5. Equipping the troops with pictures and warrants of arrest – The troops were also required to assist the PNP in law enforcement. Before jump-off, troops were provided with warrants of arrest and pictures of wanted personalities. This is to provide additional enough bases to apprehend the wanted personalities; aside from the usual charge of illegal possession of firearms.
C. Psychological shaping – In this point of time, the enemies seems to be in the upper hand in psychological shaping. They shaped the minds of the civilians in a manner that they become heroes and the government forces are the villains. The Sorsogon experience is one of the classic approaches of giving the enemy a dose of their own medicine.
1. Informing the people and the NPAs – Through the weekly radio and TV program of the 903rd Brigade, the people and the terrorists were informed about the enemy crimes and inhuman acts, such as killing of civilians and unarmed retired military personnel; extortion and recruiting children to take up arms against the government. They were also informed of the NPA internal purging operations and factionalism inside their organization.
2. Bringing the bodies of dead enemies to the Municipal Hall – Aside from giving the dead NPAs with descent burial and for proper identification, the procedure of bringing the dead rebels in the plain view of the people was purposely done to send a strong message to the people: “Don’t join them; you will end up like these.”
3. Respect for Human Rights – While the Scout Rangers were known to be fierce and audacious fighters in combat, they were exceptionally kind and caring to both civilians and the wounded/captured enemies. This extraordinary display of chivalric conduct was also done to send a stronger message: “We come to kill the armed groups, but we care for those who cannot fight.” After all, the rebels are also Filipinos and the Scout Rangers’ mandate as part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is to protect the Filipino people.
4. Caring for the civilians – In one of the encounters, as the troops maneuvered to save the children amidst the heavy exchange of fires, the terrorist indiscriminately fired towards the location of the civilians, hitting one of the children and a mother. The students rushed the wounded civilian towards a safer place and applied first aid. After the administration of IV therapy and the wounds were stabilized, the government troops wasted no time to send the wounded civilians to the nearest hospital, all being charged to the resources of the Philippine Army.
D. Use of K-9 Unit – The Scout Rangers were trained how to handle and preserve articles captured from the rebels; giving the K-9 Unit with fresh and unadulterated scent articles for tracking. The K-9 unit attached to the TGP-Bravo was able to conduct good tracking operations and the unit gave accurate direction of enemies’ escape. The result was very useful in the conduct of follow-up operations.
E. Use of Combat Trackers – Since the tracking dogs had some physical limitations, tracking the enemy was enhanced by using Scout Ranger combat trackers. Using the two (two)TGP Bravo personnel, who were certified combat trackers; the Scout Rangers provided complementary tracking efforts to the K-9 unit.
F. Utilizing Rebel Returnees – There are no other persons who know the enemies better than the NPA members themselves. During the Test Mission, the TGP-B, in coordination with 903rd Bde, utilized the services of the rebel returnees. They were instrumental in the initial determination of targets and recommended safe approaches towards each objective. They also determined the enemy most probable course of action after every major incident; because they know the tendencies and SOPs of the group, being part of it for some time.
G. Conduct of Critical Thinking Operations – The normal Scout Ranger Operation is characterized by stalking and avoiding the populated areas. As much as possible, they would complete the operations without being detected by the civilians. However, in the Sorsogon experience, the Scout Rangers experimented with a new operational approach, every time there was no available solid intelligence package about the enemy. This approach was termed “Critical Thinking” operations, where, the Scout Rangers gathered important information from the populated area and tried to spot potential informants or agents. The operation was based on the assumption that when pressured, the NPAs would tend to merge with the populace, after hiding their firearms and combat paraphernalia. Important information includes GPS location of important landmark s in the area; such as, barangay hall, house of the barangay chairman, water points, landing zones, etc. This information were very critical in planning the next maneuver or in conducting map tracking, when new information arrived for processing.
H. Breaking Patterns – It was quite difficult to break patterns for the whole two months of operations; however, TGP-B considered as a critical necessity. TGP-B broke patterns of marketing, as it scheduled its marketing on different days and pile up stock of food for varied number of days. It also did marketing at the different markets and used different cars or vehicles. The process was a bit costly, but it truly paid off. It also broke pattern of its operations, by designating different LD/LCs and pick-up areas and using different civilian vehicles to haul the opening troops.
